LI Xu-Dong1,2, NIU Yu-Kun1, WEI Ling-Bo1,2, ZHANG Chi1, YU Neng-Hai1
1. CAS Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230027, China
2. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China
the other is to make some modifications with cryptography techniques such as stealth address, ring signature, zero-knowledge proofs, homomorphic encryption. Finally, challenges and perspectives of privacy protection of Bitcoin and Blockchain are discussed.the other is to make some modifications with cryptography techniques such as stealth address, ring signature, zero-knowledge proofs, homomorphic encryption. Finally, challenges and perspectives of privacy protection of Bitcoin and Blockchain are discussed.
李旭东, 牛玉坤, 魏凌波, 张驰, 俞能海. 比特币隐私保护综述[J]. 密码学报, 2019, 6(2): 133-149.
LI X D, NIU Y K, WEI L B, ZHANG C, YU N H. Overview on Privacy Protection in Bitcoin. Journal of Cryptologic Research, 2019, 6(2): 133-149.
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2019, Vol. 6 
