Privacy Data Authentication Schemes Based on Borromean Ring Signature
ZHANG Fan1,2, HUANG Nian-Nian1,2, GAO Sheng1,2
1. Data Communication Science and Technology Research Institute, Beijing 100191, China
2. Xingtang Telecommunications Technology Co. Ltd., Beijing 100191, China
Privacy protection is a very important issue in the blockchain system. If the amount of value in some transaction is quite large, neither the payer nor the payee of the transaction wishes to disclose it. In order to hide the amount, a direct solution of this privacy protection is to make homomorphic encryption or commitment on the amount of the transaction. However, the hidden amount is not necessarily legal, which means that the amount is not a positive integer or not in certain range (e.g. [0, 248)). Besides, anyone else cannot verify the legitimacy of the amount nor the legitimacy of the transaction. Therefore, it is necessary to attach a proof to prove the legitimacy of the amount in a transaction. The data privacy authentication (range proof) schemes based on the Borromean ring signature is currently used in CT (confidential transaction). The basic idea is to divide the secret amount in a transaction by bits, and generate the public key groups and the ring signature for each bit correspondingly. The final signature is obtained by the use of the Borromean ring signature, and then it is a proof of the range of the amount. This study improves the current scheme. As we take advantage of another known scheme to generate the ring signature for each bit of secret amount, our range proof scheme reduced the time of the proof generation by about 22 percent and the time of the proof verification by about 30 percent while keeping the length of evidence invariant.
张凡, 黄念念, 高胜. 基于Borromean 环签名的隐私数据认证方案[J]. 密码学报, 2018, 5(5): 529-537.
ZHANG F, HUANG N N, GAO S. Privacy Data Authentication Schemes Based on Borromean Ring Signature. Journal of Cryptologic Research, 2018, 5(5): 529-537.
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2018, Vol. 5 
